It is difficult to find a single, major cause for the creation of the new regulatory framework in the UK, but several factors have contributed to the reform, that have spanned a period of approximately four-years. The creation of complex financial intermediaries had caused the distinctions that had previously characterized the financial sector to become blurred. Banks did not appear to be 'special' anymore or at least not as special, as before, now being in competition, both on the provision and on the gathering of funds, with other financial institutions, and entering themselves into other fields of financial intermediation, while the regulatory structure remained fragmented, and still very much reliant on self-regulation.
(banks, securities firms, insurance, etc.). Variations may exist for each model, and their distinction is, in fact, not so clear-cut as theoretically possible. The role of the central bank may range in its extension, but it is never totally out of the supervision perimeter.
Britain's choice has been the single regulator, the FSA, and a role on macro-systemic oversight attributed to the Bank of England, that keeps anyway the lender-of-last resort responsibility. This choice is based on consideration of cost-effectiveness, economies of scale and scope, on the opportunity of a uniform approach to regulation, and on consumer protection and financial crime prevention. The stability issue is not damaged, in the legislator's view, by the division of responsibilities between the regulator and the central bank -that is between the micro-supervisor and the macro-oversighter: the linkage between the FSA and the Bank rests on a Memorandum of Understanding (that includes the Treasury) and is assured by a continuous contact between the two.
The objectives and principles to be followed by the FSA are determined by the FSMA 2000 and they are strictly derived from the above view. The Act also specifies the legal status, the governance, the accountability of the FSA, and delegates to the Treasury, and to the same FSA, secondary legislation powers, to be exercised in a very detailed way. The regulatory approach of the FSA is described as 'risk-based', that is proportional to the riskiness of the supervised institution, where the intensity of the risk is measured on the basis of probability that a problem occurs, and on the impact that the institution's problem may cause in the system. The other approach of the FSA is 'principle-based', an approach that seems still underway and that has to be reconciled with the detailed regulatory framework set up by the statutory legislation.
This chapter ends with an illustration of retail customer protection, where there is ample room for self-regulation (the Banking Code), and with the connected theme of crisis management. This issue is under review, particularly in connection with the turmoil of 2007; the crises of banks are, presently, not subject to special legislation as in other countries, and the deposit protection is structured in a way rather similar to the protection of other financial instruments, a consequence of the blurring, already mentioned, of the boundaries between financial intermediaries. However, an increase in the level of protection of bank deposits has been recently, and hastily, approved.
An overview
As seen in previous chapters, the pressure exerted by market forces had given rise to complex new intermediaries and financial products, thanks
